

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SAJ-01 IO-10 ACDA-05 NIC-01 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 EB-07 DOTE-00 OMB-01

TRSE-00 ERDA-05 BIB-01 /088 W
----- 021061

R 201752Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8827

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 04622

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, PFOR, GW, GE, WB, UR

SUBJECT: CHANCELLERY OFFICIAL'S BRIEFING OF ALLIED
AMBASSADORS ON INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS.

SUMMARY: RESPONDING TO A REQUEST, CHANCELLERY OFFICIAL
SANNE BRIEFED THREE ALLIED AMBASSADORS ON INNER-GERMAN
NEGOTIATIONS SET TO BEGIN MARCH 24. HE ALSO COMMENTED
ON ABRASIMOV'S RETURN TO EAST BERLIN. END SUMMARY.

1. ON MARCH 19 CHANCELLERY OFFICIAL (SANNE) WITH DIRECT
RESPONSIBILITY UNDER CHANCELLOR FOR INNER-GERMAN MATTERS
BRIEFED THE THREE ALLIED AMBASSADORS ON THE NEGOTIATIONS
NOW SET TO BEGIN MARCH 24 WITH THE GDR. IN SKETCHING
OUT BRIEFLY THE BACKGROUND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SANNE
RECALLED THE DECEMBER 9 MESSAGES FROM THE GDR TO THE
FRG AND TO THE SENAT IN WHICH THE EAST GERMANS STATED
THEIR READINESS TO BEGIN TALKS WITH THE SENAT AND THE
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FEDERAL REPUBLIC ON A LARGE NUMBER OF MATTERS AFFECTING

PRIMARILY TRANSIT TRAFFIC (ROAD, RAIL, AND WATER) BETWEEN WEST BERLIN AND THE FRG (SEE BONN 18976, DEC. 9, 1974). THE CENTRAL GDR CONDITION FOR BEGINNING THESE TALKS HAD BEEN THAT NONE OF THE COSTS INVOLVED IN IMPROVING THE TRANSIT ROUTES SHOULD FALL TO THEM. IN RESPONDING POSITIVELY TO THE EAST GERMAN OFFER, HOWEVER, THE FRG HAD STATED TWO CONDITIONS OF ITS OWN: A) COST SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED AMONG BOTH THE FRG AND THE GDR; AND B) THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE COSTS WOULD FALL UNDER ARTICLE 18 OF THE TRAFFIC TRANSIT AGREEMENT (ARTICLE 18 PROVIDES THAT COSTS RELATING TO TRAFFIC ON THE TRANSIT ROUTES SHALL BE PAID BY THE FRG TO THE GDR AS AN ANNUAL LUMP SUM; THIS ARTICLE ALSO SETS THE AMOUNT OF THE LUMP SUM THROUGH 1975, STATING THAT FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1976 ONWARDS THE AMOUNT SHALL BE DETERMINED IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1975 TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSIT TRAFFIC). SANNE SAID THAT THE GDR TOOK NOTE OF THE FRG'S TWO POINTS AND BY MEANS OF HONECKER-SCHMIDT AND OTHER CONTACTS INDICATED READINESS TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS VERY QUICKLY. AT THE END OF JANUARY GAUS HAD SPECIFICALLY TOLD THE GDR THAT BONN WAS NEARLY READY TO BEGIN AND WOULD NEED ONLY TWO WEEKS OR SO TO COMPLETE PREPARATION. AT THIS TIME GAUS ALSO MADE THE PROPOSAL FOR THE CENTRAL NEGOTIATING DELEGATIONS (SEE BONN 2523). THE GDR REPLY TO THIS APPROACH WAS AN INDICATION THAT THE EAST GERMANS WERE IN NOT SUCH A GREAT HURRY BUT NEVERTHELESS INDICATED A DESIRE TO BEGIN FAIRLY QUICKLY. IN THE MEANTIME, SANNE RECALLED, THERE HAD BEEN THE PUBLIC PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE FRG AND GDR (E.G. THE GDR-AUSTRIAN CONSULAR AGREEMENT, AND THE CHANCELLOR'S COMMENTS IN HIS STATE OF THE NATION STATEMENT TO THE BUNDESTAG) AND THERE WERE SIGNALS FROM THE EAST GERMANS THAT THEY DID NOT BELIEVE THEY COULD NEGOTIATE IN SUCH AN ATMOSPHERE. THEN, ON MARCH 11 AT LEIPZIG, GDR FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER SOELLE SAID THAT THERE WERE PROBLEMS BECAUSE THE FRG WAS PUTTING "DROPS OF POISON INTO THE ATMOSPHERE." NEVERTHELESS, ONLY A FEW DAYS LATER NIER INFORMED GAUS THAT THE GDR WAS READY TO BEGIN ON MARCH 24.

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2. SANNE SAID IT WAS THUS CLEAR THAT SOMETHING HAD RESTRAINED THE GDR FROM MOVING AHEAD AS QUICKLY AS IT HAD FIRST INDICATED IT WAS PREPARED TO DO. FRG ECONOMISTS ARE OF THE VIEW THAT BENEFITS WHICH THE GDR MAY OBTAIN IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS COULD HELP THEM BRIDGE BUDGETARY, ECONOMIC, AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY A SHORTAGE OF HARD CURRENCY. POLITICALLY, SANNE SAID THE GDR WAS PROBABLY INTERESTED AFTER THE GUILLAUME

AFFAIR AND CHANGE OF CHANCELLORS IN MAKING A GESTURE TO THE NEW FRG GOVERNMENT. SANNE SAID THERE IS, OF COURSE, SPECULATION THAT BREZHNEV'S PERIOD OF INACTIVITY CAUSED SOME OF THE DELAY BY CREATING UNCERTAINTY WITHIN THE GDR GOVERNMENT. SANNE SAID BONN KNEW THAT DURING THE JAN. 27-28 AXEN (AND NEW GDR FON MIN FISCHER) VISIT IN MOSCOW THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT BOTH THE GDR AND THE FRG WERE READY TO BEGIN. BONN DOES NOT KNOW THE

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DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 EB-07 DOTE-00 OMB-01

TRSE-00 ERDA-05 BIB-01 /088 W

----- 021759

R 201752Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8828

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

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SOVIET REPLY BUT BELIEVES THEY SIMPLY INDICATED "NOT YET." SANNE SAID HE WAS STILL PUZZLED BY THE SOVIET ROLE. UNTIL DECEMBER BONN HAD DETECTED A PUSH FROM THE SOVIETS BUT BEGINNING TOWARD THE END OF JANUARY BONN DETECTED A PAUSE, POSSIBLY CONNECTED WITH BREZHNEV'S ILLNESS. SANNE SAID HE WOULDN'T GO SO FAR AS TO SAY

THAT THE SOVIETS REFUSED TO GIVE A GREEN LIGHT BUT PERHAPS A GROUP IN THE SOVIET UNION AGAINST THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE ABLE SIMPLY TO CAUSE A DELAY. REGARDING AN ABRASIMOV ROLE IN THE DELAY, SANNE INDICATED HE WAS INCLINED AGAINST ATTRIBUTING MUCH TO SUCH SPECULATION. HE SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BONN THAT ABRASIMOV HAD WANTED TO BE STATE SECRETARY FOR PROPAGANDA BUT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO GET THIS JOB. IT THUS SEEMED THAT ABRASIMOV'S RETURN TO BERLIN HAD NOT BEEN PLANNED. SANNE SAID HIS PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL

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TRANSFER HAD MORE TO DO WITH INTERNAL SOVIET BUREAUCRATIC MANEUVERING THAN ANY CONSCIOUS DECISION ON THE PART OF MOSCOW TO TRANSFER HIM FOR SPECIFIC POLICY REASONS. SANNE SAID THAT ANY SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN EAST BERLIN, AS "STAATHALTER", COULD PUSH THE HARD LINE.

3. REGARDING THE FRG PROPOSAL FOR CENTRAL NEGOTIATING DELEGATIONS, THE GDR HAD INDICATED THAT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO GO ALONG. THE FRG SIMPLY RESPONDED THAT GAUS WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE THE DELEGATION LEADER FOR BONN AND THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH SEPARATE GDR REPRESENTATIVES ON THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL. SANNE SAID THE GDR HAD STATED ITS READINESS TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON MARCH 24 ON ROAD TRAFFIC, AND THAT BONN HAD AGREED, BUT REQUESTING THAT DISCUSSIONS OPEN MARCH 25 ON RAIL TRAFFIC. THE GDR DID NOT REFUSE THIS PROPOSAL BUT INDICATED THEY WISH TO BEGIN TALKS ON RAIL TRAFFIC ONLY IN APRIL. SANNE SAID THIS WAS NOT VERY SATISFACTORY TO BONN BUT THE FRG IS NOT MAKING AN ISSUE OF THIS BECAUSE IT IS IMPORTANT FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS IN THE FRG TO AVOID ANY LONGER DELAY.

4. SANNE SAID THAT WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN NEXT WEEK THE FRG WILL MAKE A BIG PITCH FOR CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE TRANSIT TRAFFIC. THESE WOULD HAVE LITTLE COST BUT WOULD BRING REAL IMPROVEMENTS QUICKLY AND VISIBLY. FOR EXAMPLE, SANNE MENTIONED IMPROVEMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR USE BY FRG VESSELS OF CANAL LOCKS IN THE GDR, IMPROVEMENTS IN TRUCK PROCESSING POINTS, AND INCLUSION OF TRANSIT TRAINS IN THE TEE AND INTER-CITY RAIL NETS. SANNE SAID THAT SOME OF THESE THINGS HAVE ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE FRG-GDR TRANSIT COMMISSION AND BONN IS NOT SURE HOW THE GDR WILL REACT TO THESE PROPOSALS IN THE UPCOMING NEGOTIATIONS. HE REPEATED THAT THESE MEASURES COULD BE DONE QUICKLY AND VISIBLY WITH LITTLE COST AND WITH REAL BENEFIT (READ FRG DOMESTIC POLITICAL BENEFIT AS WELL AS

BENEFIT TO TRANSIT TRAFFIC). SANNE INDICATED THAT THE DIFFICULT ASPECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE THAT THE FRG WILL BE TRYING TO MAXIMIZE POLITICAL GAIN WHILE THE CONFIDENTIAL

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GDR WILL BE TRYING TO MAXIMIZE ECONOMIC GAIN AND MINIMIZE THE POLITICAL.

5. REGARDING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO SET THE LUMP SUM PAYMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 18 OF THE TTA, SANNE SAID THAT THE GDR FINANCE MINISTER HAD RECENTLY WRITTEN TO FRG FINANCE MINISTER APEL REQUESTING THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN SOON. SANNE SAID THAT APEL WILL ONLY ACKNOWLEDGE THE LETTER SAYING THAT GAUS WILL REPLY IN DETAIL. GAUS' LETTER WILL SAY THAT THE FRG IS PREPARED TO BEGIN BUT THAT THE AMOUNTS WILL ONLY BE KNOWN TOWARD THE END OF THE YEAR WHEN THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TRANSIT TRAFFIC WILL BE CLEAR AND WHEN IT IS KNOWN HOW THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE TRANSIT IMPROVEMENTS ARE GOING. SANNE SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THIS NEGOTIATION ON THE LUMP SUM PAYMENT AND THE SWING CREDIT ARRANGEMENT. HE ADDED THAT ONE HEARS THAT THE FRG COULD ACTUALLY DOUBLE THE AMOUNT OF THE LUMP SUM PAYMENT. SANNE DID NOT THINK THIS WAS POSSIBLE BECAUSE ARTICLE 18 OF THE TTA CLEARLY SETS OUT THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THIS PAYMENT WILL BE USED. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE GDR COULD POSSIBLY OBTAIN FUNDS IN THIS WAY FOR NEW TRANSIT TRAFFIC PROCESSING POINTS. SANNE NOTED THAT THE GDR UNDER ARTICLE 18 HAS RECEIVED FROM BONN ALMOST ONE BILLION WEST GERMAN MARKS.

6. REGARDING THE TELTOW CANAL, IT IS BONN'S POSITION

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DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 EB-07 DOTE-00 OMB-01

TRSE-00 ERDA-05 BIB-01 /088 W

----- 021424

R 201752Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8829

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

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THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR THE FRG TO DO THE NEGOTIATION, BUT UNREALISTIC TO THINK THAT THE GDR WILL AGREE. GAUS, AS INSTRUCTED BY THE CHANCELLOR, HAS TESTED THE GDR POSITION ON THIS AND IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT THE GDR WILL INSIST THAT THE SENAT BE ITS INTERLOCUTOR ON THE CANAL. CONSEQUENTLY, THE FRG HAS INFORMED THE SENAT THAT WHILE BONN RESERVES ITS RIGHT TO DISCUSS THE CANAL WITH THE GDR INsofar AS TRANSIT TRAFFIC IS CONCERNED, THE SENAT SHOULD GO AHEAD AND AGREE TO NEGOTIATE THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF CONSTRUCTION MEASURES AND FINANCIAL DETAILS OF GETTING THE CANAL BACK INTO OPERATION.

7. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION FROM FRENCH AMBASSADOR WORMSER, SANNE SAID THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAD SPOKEN WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR FALIN EARLY IN THE WEEK RAISING CONFIDENTIAL

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THE QUESTION OF THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT WHICH WOULD BE BUILT IN THE SOVIET UNION AND WHICH WOULD DELIVER POWER VIA POLAND AND EAST GERMANY TO WEST BERLIN AND THE FRG. SCHMIDT TOLD FALIN THAT SINCE LAST FALL THERE HAD BEEN NO SOVIET-WEST GERMANY CONTACT ON THIS MATTER AND THAT ONE HEARS THAT THERE ARE PROBLEMS WITH THE POLES AND THE EAST GERMANS. SCHMIDT SAID HE WAS ASTONISHED AT THIS SINCE KOSYGIN IN MOSCOW HAD INDICATED THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEMS ON THIS SCORE. FALIN'S RESPONSE MADE IT CLEAR TO SCHMIDT THAT THE SOVIET POSITION IS STILL NOT FIXED

AND THAT MOSCOW WAS APPARENTLY STILL TALKING, OR HAD NOT EVEN BEGUN TO TALK, WITH WARSAW AND EAST BERLIN. SANNE SAID THAT FALIN'S COMMENT TO SCHMIDT THAT IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR THE CHANCELLOR HIMSELF TO ASK MOSCOW DIRECTLY PROBABLY MEANS THAT FALIN HIMSELF IS NOT SURE WHERE MOSCOW NOW STANDS ON THIS MATTER. SANNE ADDED THAT IT COULDN'T BE EXCLUDED THAT THE REASONS FOR THE HIATUS ON THIS TOPIC ARE THE SAME AS FOR THE PAUSE IN MOVING AHEAD ON THE INNER-GERMAN FRONT. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED A REPORT ON ECONOMICS MINISTER FRIDERICH'S RAISING OF THIS IN MOSCOW WHEN HE WAS THERE LAST WEEK IN CONNECTION WITH THE FRG EXHIBITION. THE GDR HAD ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TO BE LOCATED IN THE GDR BUT WERE TOLD THAT BONN WAS CURRENTLY DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR POWER WITH MOSCOW AND DID NOT WANT TO TALK AT THE SAME TIME ABOUT THE SUBJECT WITH THE EAST GERMANS. THE FRG REPLY ALSO NOTED THAT SINCE THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT WOULD BE PAID FOR BY ELECTRIC CURRENT DELIVERED TO THE WEST GERMANS, AND SINCE THE FRG AND WEST BERLIN COULD ABSORB ONLY SO MUCH, THERE WAS NO NEED TO PROCEED WITH DISCUSSIONS ON THIS NOW WITH THE GDR.

8. REGARDING BONN'S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, SANNE SAID THAT THEY HAD NOTED NO TENDENCY FOR FALIN TO WANT TO DISCUSS BERLIN MATTERS WITH BONN. ON THE QA ITSELF, SANNE SAID, MOSCOW HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT CORRESPONDING TALKS WERE NOT NECESSARY SINCE BONN WAS NOT A SIGNATORY. ON THE OTHER HAND, MOSCOW HAS SAID THAT THEY NEED CONTACTS ON BERLIN BECAUSE THE FULFILLMENT OF THE QA AFFECTS THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND CONFIDENTIAL

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THERE WAS A NEED "TO CAST OFF BALLAST WHICH HAS ACCUMULATED. SANNE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS ALSO COMPLAIN THAT PROBLEMS CAUSED IN THE QA WERE THE RESULT OF FRG PRESSURES ON THE THREE ALLIES. SANNE COMPLAINED THAT "UNEDUCABLES" IN THE USSR, POLAND AND THE GDR WERE TRYING TO PUSH THINGS BACK TO THE PRE-1969 PERIOD. HE SAID THAT PERHAPS THERE WAS A CONNECTION HERE WITH THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF DEFEAT OF GERMANY, AND HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT IN THESE THREE COUNTRIES IT WAS "NOT DANGEROUS" AT THE PRESENT TO ATTACK THE FRG. HE NOTED THAT FALIN HAD RECENTLY MADE AN UNOFFICIAL DEMARCHE TO THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE REGARDING THE QUESTION OF PUBLICATION OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO EASTERN CRIMES COMMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE EXPULSION OF ETHNIC GERMANS AFTER THE WAR.
HILLENBRAND

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, AMBASSADORS, NEGOTIATIONS, MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 MAR 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975BONN04622
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750098-0010
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750334/aaaabdxj.tel
Line Count: 384
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 15 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <15 APR 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <16 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CHANCELLERY OFFICIAL'S BRIEFING OF ALLIED AMBASSADORS ON INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS.
TAGS: PGOV, PFOR, GE, GC, WB, UR, (SANNE)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006